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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In this appeal, Vincent Calvillo has asserted that the prosecutor in his trial 
committed misconduct in closing arguments, rising to the level of a fundamental error, 
where the prosecutor impliedly commented on Mr. Calvillo's failure to testify at trial as 
proof of his guilt. This Reply Brief is necessary to respond to the State's arguments 
regarding this contention. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Calvillo's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct during closing arguments, rising to the level of a 
fundamental error, when the prosecutor indirectly commented on Mr. Calvillo's right to 
remain silent by repeatedly referencing C.V.'s testimony at trial as "uncontroverted"? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct During Closing Arguments, Rising To The Level 
Of A Fundamental Error, When The Prosecutor Indirectly Commented On Mr. Calvillo's 
Right To Remain Silent By Repeatedly Referencing CV.'S Testimony At Trial As 
"Uncontroverted" 
A. Introduction 
In response to Mr. Calvillo's assertion of error in this appeal, the State contends 
that none of the three prongs of the Perrl test for fundamental error are met in this 
case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-12.) However, under pertinent case law regarding the 
right to remain silent at trial, as well as the record of proceedings in this case, the 
prosecutorial misconduct in this case rises to the level of a fundamental error that 
requires reversal. 
B. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct During Closing Arguments, Rising To 
The Level Of A Fundamental Error, When The Prosecutor Indirectly Commented 
On Mr. Calvillo's Right To Remain Silent By Repeatedly Referencing C.V.'S 
Testimony At Trial As "Uncontroverted" 
Under the Perry test for fundamental error, the defendant must demonstrate: (1) 
that one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) that 
this error is obvious from the face of the record; and (3) that the error was not harmless. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). In this case, the State disputes each of 
these standards with regard to the prosecutorial misconduct in this case. However, a 
review of the pertinent case law, as well as the record in this case, reveals the opposite: 
that the prosecutorial misconduct in this case rises to the level of a fundamental error 
that requires reversal. 
1 State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). 
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The State's first argument is that the misconduct at issue does not involve one of 
Mr. Calvillo's unwaived constitutional rights. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 7 -10.) The State's 
basis for this assertion is the claim that Mr. Calvillo's absence from part of the trial 
proceedings operated as a forfeiture of his right not to testify at trial - as well as his 
corresponding right against the prosecutor arguing any such failure to testify as proof of 
guilt. However, not only is the State's assertion entirely unsupported by any case law 
within its brief, it is contrary to the actual legal standards regarding the right of a 
defendant to remain silent at trial. 
From the outset, the State makes the following claim, "the trial exception 
requirement that an invocation of the right to remain silent [does] not apply," because 
Mr. Calvillo's counsel had stated in opening arguments that Mr. Calvillo would testify, 
but subsequently Mr. Calvillo did not testify and was not present for the latter half of his 
trial proceedings. (Respondent's Brief, p.B.) The State cites to no legal authority at all 
for this proposition. (Respondent's Brief, pp.B-10.) A party waives an issue on appeal if 
either argument or authority is lacking. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). 
Accordingly, because the State cites to no authority for the proposition that the Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent, and the protections attendant thereon, are waived by 
a defendant's absence from trial, the State has waived this claim. 
The State has likely cited to no legal authority for this proposition because the 
State's position is contrary to the law. The State cites to two facts from the record to 
support its forfeiture argument: (1) the statements made by defense counsel during 
opening argument indicating Mr. Calvillo'S future intent to testify; and (2) the fact that 
Mr. Calvillo was absent for the last half of his trial proceedings. (Respondent's Brief, 
4 
p.S.) However, a review of the pertinent case law reveals that these two facts are 
actually irrelevant to the legal analysis. 
Any statements made by Mr. Calvillo's counsel during oral argument cannot be 
construed or deemed a waiver of Mr. Calvillo's Fifth Amendment right not to testify at 
trial. First, the arguments of the parties are not evidence in criminal proceedings. See, 
e.g., State v. Fondren, 24 Idaho 663 (1913). Although his counsel may have anticipated 
that Mr. Calvillo would testify at trial, the mere indication of this understanding during 
opening argument is in no way, of itself, a waiver of Mr. Calvillo's right not to do so. 
This leads to the more important reason why trial counsel's statements during opening 
argument are not relevant to the question of Mr. Calvillo's Fifth Amendment right not to 
testify at trial. That is, only Mr. Calvillo acting on his own behalf could effectuate such 
a waiver. 
The ultimate decision as to whether to testify at trial, or instead invoke and rely 
upon one's right to remain silent, is personal to the defendant. "[E]very criminal 
defendant has a fundamental right to testify on his or her own behalf," and "the 
defendant is vested with the ultimate authority to decide whether or not to testify." 
Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700,704 (Ct. App. 2012). This right has been recognized 
by the United States Supreme Court as one that can only be exercised by the defendant 
personally through a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. See, e.g., Florida v. 
Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-418 (1988). 
Given that any waiver of Mr. Calvillo's right to remain silent at trial could only be 
exercised by him - and by him alone - trial counsel's statements during opening 
argument are not of legal consequence to Mr. Calvillo's Fifth Amendment rights at trial. 
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The second fact relied upon by the State is likewise not sufficient to support any 
finding that Mr. Calvillo waived the Fifth Amendment rights at issue in this appeal. The 
State is, in essence, arguing that Mr. Calvillo's absence from his trial proceedings 
operates as a forfeiture of his Fifth Amendment right both not to testify at trial and his 
corresponding protection against any failure to testify being used against him at trial. 
This is contrary to controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent. As an initial starting point, 
any comment on the failure of the defendant to testify in a criminal trial is a violation of 
the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. Griffin v. California, 
380 U.S. 609, 613-615 (1965). Moreover, "a criminal defendant need not take the stand 
and assert the privilege at his own triaL" Salinas v. Texas, U.S. _, 133 S. 
Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013). Because a defendant has an, "'absolute right not to testify,'" a 
defendant's reasons for not testifying at trial and instead remaining silent "are irrelevant 
to his constitutional right to do so." Id. (quoting Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 
433 (1970». Therefore, in the context of the failure of the defendant to testify at trial, 
the case law is abundantly clear that a defendant is in no way affirmatively required to 
invoke the right or else see it forfeited. Id. Rather, unlike other contexts, the defendant 
is deemed to rest on his right to remain silent at trial unless he or she personally waives 
this right. 
Because it is based on nearly the same facts and issue as this case, the case of 
McFadden v. State from the Supreme Court of South Carolina is also instructive on this 
point. See McFadden v. State, 539 S.E.2d 391 (S.C. 2000). In McFadden, the 
defendant was initially present for the jury selection portion of the trial, but left the 
courthouse during a break prior to the commencement of the actual trial and never 
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returned. Id. at 394 n.4. During the closing arguments at McFadden's trial, the 
prosecutor commented on the failure of the defendant to present any evidence during 
the trial. Id. at 393. The McFadden Court found ineffective assistance on the part of 
trial counsel in failing to object to these remarks - despite the fact of the defendant's 
absence from trial - because this closing argument violated the defendant's right to 
remain silent at trial as an indirect comment on his failure to testify. Id. at 393-394. The 
McFadden Court further rejected any notion that the defendant's act of absenting 
himself from trial somehow rendered permissible any inference of guilt based on this 
absence. Id. at 394-395. This Court should do the same. 
Mr. Calvillo never waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent at trial. The 
State's argument to the contrary is without merit. 
The State also suggests that the failure of trial counsel to object to the 
prosecutor's improper comments on Mr. Calvillo's failure to testify may have been the 
result of a tactical decision. However, as noted above, the controlling case law on this 
point is clear: a defendant has an absolute right under the Fifth Amendment not to 
testify, regardless of his or her reasons for not doing so, and any comment on the 
exercise of this right for purposes of inferring guilt is likewise barred by the Fifth 
Amendment. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected a similar claim in the recent case of 
State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 568 (2013) 
There, the Court held that if trial counsel, "did not recognize the impropriety of the 
deputy prosecutor's actions, ignorance of the law is not a tactical decision." Id. There 
was no tactical advantage at all to be gained by permitting the prosecutor to argue that 
Mr. Calvillo's failure to testify should be taken as proof of his guilt. The case law is 
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extensive and well-established that such argument is forbidden under the Fifth 
Amendment. Accordingly, the failure to object cannot be deemed a reasonable tactical 
decision. 
Finally, for the reasons stated previously in the Appellant's Brief, this error cannot 
be deemed harmless. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.12-14.) 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Calvillo respectfully requests that this Court reverse his judgment of 
conviction and sentence, and remand his case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 13th day of January, 2014. 
SARAH E. TOMPKI 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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